Elsevier

Behaviour Research and Therapy

Volume 62, November 2014, Pages 129-139
Behaviour Research and Therapy

The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An analysis of methodological and conceptual challenges

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2014.07.019Get rights and content

Highlights

  • I review shortcomings with the extant classification system that led to calls for change.

  • I lay out the assumptions of the competing Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) program.

  • I examine four key conceptual and methodological challenges to RDoC's progress.

  • I present potential remedies for each of these challenges.

Abstract

In a bold effort to address the longstanding shortcomings of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) framework for the classification and diagnosis of psychopathology, the National Institute of Mental Health recently launched a research program – the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) – in the hopes of developing an alternative taxonomic system rooted in dysfunctional brain circuitry. Although the RDoC endeavor has considerable promise, it faces several methodological and conceptual challenges, four of which I address here: (a) an overemphasis on biological units and measures, (b) neglect of measurement error, (c) biological and psychometric limitations of endophenotypes, and (d) the distinction between biological predispositions and their behavioral manifestations. Because none of these challenges is in principle insurmountable, I encourage investigators to consider potential remedies for them. RDoC is a calculated gamble that appears to be worth the risk, but its chances of success will be maximized by a thoughtful consideration of hard-won lessons learned – but frequently forgotten – over the past several decades of psychological and psychiatric research.

Section snippets

The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): an analysis of conceptual and methodological challenges

It perhaps goes without saying that our current model of psychiatric classification has left many researchers and clinicians dissatisfied (Frances, 2013, Greenberg, 2013). In contrast to contemporary systems of classification in internal medicine, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which first appeared in 1952, diagnoses individuals almost exclusively on the basis of their signs (overt manifestations) and symptoms (subjective reports) rather than on the basis of

The DSM and its discontents

Of course, these disagreements are hardly new. Deep-seated discontent regarding the prevailing DSM model has been a recurring theme in clinical psychology and psychiatry over the past several decades (e.g., Faust and Miner, 1986, Kirk and Kutchins, 1992, Widiger and Clark, 2000). Indeed, both apologists and critics of the DSM have apparently managed to achieve consensus on one point: The current system of classification and diagnosis is far from optimal. Even the most fervent defenders of the

The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) proposal: mental disorders as dysfunctions of brain circuits

Against the backdrop of lingering discontent with the DSM and ICD, in 2009 the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) initiated a bold initiative to transform the current framework of psychiatric classification and diagnosis into an explicitly biological system (Cuthbert, 2014, Insel et al., 2010, Sanislow et al., 2010). Dubbed the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), largely as an homage to the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) that were precursors to the DSM-III criteria (Spitzer, Endicott,

Concluding thoughts

RDoC is a calculated gamble. Given that incremental efforts to improve the DSM by nibbling around its edges have not translated into measurable declines in the morbidity and mortality of most serious psychiatric disorders (Insel, 2009), NIMH's substantial investment of time and money in a rival paradigm would appear to be worth the risk. Even if RDoC is not an unqualified success, the knowledge yielded by the endeavor may contribute to valuable insights regarding the classification and etiology

References (141)

  • H.B. Moss et al.

    Subtypes of alcohol dependence in a nationally representative sample

    Drug and Alcohol Dependence

    (2007)
  • J.T. Noga et al.

    Cingulate gyrus in schizophrenic patients and normal volunteers

    Psychiatry Research

    (1995)
  • Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organizations

    Psychodynamic diagnostic manual (PDM)

    (2006)
  • American Psychiatric Association

    Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition (DSM-III)

    (1980)
  • American Psychiatric Association

    Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5)

    (2013)
  • N.C. Andreasen

    The broken brain: The biological revolution in psychiatry

    (1984)
  • R.F. Baumeister et al.

    Psychology as the science of self-reports and finger movements: whatever happened to actual behavior?

    Perspectives on Psychological Science

    (2007)
  • C.M. Bennett et al.

    How reliable are the results from functional magnetic resonance imaging?

    Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

    (2010)
  • H. Berenbaum

    Classification and psychopathology research

    Journal of Abnormal Psychology

    (2013)
  • R.K. Blashfield

    The classification of psychopathology: Neo-Krraepelinian and quantitative approaches

    (1984)
  • J. Block

    Advancing the psychology of personality: paradigmatic shift or improving the quality of research?

  • K.T. Brady et al.

    Comorbidity of psychiatric disorders and posttraumatic stress disorder

    Journal of Clinical Psychiatry

    (2000)
  • K.S. Button et al.

    Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience

    Nature Reviews Neuroscience

    (2013)
  • Button, K.S., & Munafo, M.F. (in press). Powering reproducible research. In S.O. Lilienfeld and I.D. Waldman (Eds.),...
  • A.L. Byrd et al.

    Understanding desisting and persisting forms of delinquency: the unique contributions of disruptive behavior disorders and interpersonal callousness

    Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry

    (2012)
  • T.D. Cannon et al.

    Endophenotypes in the genetic analyses of mental disorders

    Annual Review of Clinical Psychology

    (2006)
  • N. Cantor

    From thought to behavior: “Having” and “doing” in the study of personality and cognition

    American Psychologist

    (1990)
  • A.G. Cardno et al.

    Twin studies of schizophrenia: from bow-and-arrow concordances to star wars Mx and functional genomics

    American Journal of Medical Genetics

    (2000)
  • L.J. Chapman et al.

    Scales for sphysical and social anhedonia

    Journal of Abnormal Psychology

    (1976)
  • D. Cicchetti et al.

    Equifinality and multifinality in developmental psychopathology

    Development and Psychopathology

    (1996)
  • S.G. Costafreda et al.

    Multisite fMRI reproducibility of a motor task using identical MR systems

    Journal of Magnetic Resonance Imaging

    (2007)
  • A.O. Cramer et al.

    Comorbidity: a network perspective

    Behavioral and Brain Sciences

    (2010)
  • B.N. Cuthbert

    The RDoC framework: facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology

    World Psychiatry

    (2014)
  • B.N. Cuthbert et al.

    Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: the seven pillars of RDoC

    BMC Medicine

    (2013)
  • B.N. Cuthbert et al.

    Constructing constructs for psychopathology: the NIMH research domain criteria

    Journal of Abnormal Psychology

    (2013)
  • M. Davis

    Neural systems involved in fear and anxiety measured with fear-potentiated startle

    American Psychologist

    (2006)
  • E.L. Dempster et al.

    Disease-associated epigenetic changes in monozygotic twins discordant for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder

    Human Molecular Genetics

    (2011)
  • S. Epstein

    The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the time

    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

    (1979)
  • S. Epstein

    The stability of behavior: II. Implications for psychological research

    American Psychologist

    (1980)
  • S. Epstein

    The stability of confusion: a reply to Mischel and Peake

    Psychological Review

    (1983)
  • M.J. Farah et al.

    The seductive allure of “seductive allure.”

    Perspectives on Psychological Science

    (2013)
  • D. Faust et al.

    The empiricist and his new clothes: DSM-III in perspective

    American Journal of Psychiatry

    (1986)
  • M. First

    Preserving the clinician-research interface in the age of RDoC

    World Psychiatry

    (2014)
  • J. Flint et al.

    The endophenotype concept in psychiatric genetics

    Psychological Medicine

    (2007)
  • W.C. Follette et al.

    Models of scientific progress and the role of theory in taxonomy development: a case study of the DSM

    Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology

    (1996)
  • A. Frances

    The DSM-III personality disorders section: a commentary

    American Journal of Psychiatry

    (1980)
  • A. Frances

    Saving normal: An insider's revolt against out-of-control psychiatric diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the medicalization of ordinary life

    (2013)
  • A. Frances

    RDoC is necessary, but very oversold

    World Psychiatry

    (2014)
  • J.C. Franklin et al.

    How developmental psychopathology theory and research can inform the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project

    Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology

    (2014)
  • K.W.M. Fulford

    RDoC+: taking translation seriously

    World Psychiatry

    (2014)
  • Cited by (157)

    • A new science of mental disorders: Using personalised, transdiagnostic, dynamical systems to understand, model, diagnose and treat psychopathology

      2022, Behaviour Research and Therapy
      Citation Excerpt :

      In many countries, treatment recommendations, as well as reimbursement by health insurance companies, are determined by the gold standard DSM or ICD classifications. The classification manuals advanced the field tremendously, but they have also been criticised for their lack of reliability, validity, and clinical utility (e.g., Borsboom, 2008; Lilienfeld, 2014). First, the DSM and ICD have their roots in medicine and are based on a ‘common cause’ framework, assuming that a mental disorder consists of symptoms that all follow from one or more underlying causes.

    View all citing articles on Scopus
    View full text